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(A) The Global economy has had an unprecedented fifteen years of growth of 
GDP along with a high degree of integration in the flows of capital, 
commodities and labour. This growth unlike earlier periods has enabled 
countries of Asia to emerge as economic powerhouses. 
 
(B) This growth ended in late 2007/early 2008. It is one of the deepest crisis 
because it is a dual crisis of the financial system and the real 
output/employment economy. The financial crisis has been caused by a 
collapse of asset prices which have been acquired against highly leveraged 
positions by the financial institutions. They face the double problem of 
liquidity and solvency. The problem in my view was not so much under-
pricing of risk as under-pricing of credit, or as Wicksell said a hundred years 
ago having a market rate of interest below the natural rate. The resulting 
boom and collapse have been anticipated in the economics literature by 
Hayek in his 1930’s work Profits Interest and Investment. 
 
 
(C) This financial crisis has made the application of standard Keynesian policies 
difficult as the problem is of under-saving, not over-saving. The under-saving 
in the OECD economies ( broadly speaking ) was financed by the global 
flows of excess savings of Asian and other economies. This flow from savers 
to consumers is one that happens all the time in national economies and the 
banking system facilitates it. In the global context, there being no truly global 
banking systems and  no global currency either , the flows were 
intermediated through US Treasury Bills or generally through the US 
financial system. This gave the US a seigniorage gain and allowed 
unsustainable credit booms to be launched with the Central Banks not just 
watching, but applauding. 
 
(D) The urgent task at the national levels is to fight the output recession and 
recapitalise the banks. But at the global level we need to consider urgently the 
building of an international currency system which would insulate all national 
economies, especially the USA from seigniorage gains, which make the 
pursuit of sound financial systems difficult. The world needs an intermediary 
which recycles surplus savings to deserving borrowers in ways which can 
reduce excess volatility. 
 
 
(E) This is where the IMF could have   a crucial role to play. The G20 has 
already assigned a large  tranche of credit to augment its resources. This will 
help in the rescue operations of fragile banking systems in many economies. 
But as many surplus nation especially the Chinese have argued the need is  
also for creation of a reserve currency which can bear the burden of being a 
global asset. Keynes’s ideas of the BANCOR are useful here. The central 
point is that the reserve currency should be a combination of national 
currencies and also try to stabilise commodity prices whose volatility 
augmented the financial boom in its last stages and hastened the real output 
recession.( the oil price movements between September 2007 and July 2008 
for example.) 
 
(F) The commodity price stabilisation need not be done by active bufferstock 
holdings but by judicious countercyclical intervention in the commodities 
futures markets. There has been a number of proposals by economists such 
Kaldor during the last commodities price boom/bust of the 1970’s, These 
need to be re-examined, 
 
 
(G) This meeting should take up some of these issues for further development. 
